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The Scholarly Publishing Scene — Publisher
Ownership and Share Prices
Column Editor: Myer Kutz (President, Myer Kutz Associates, Inc.) <myerkutz@aol.com>

S

ometime before I left Wiley in 1990 (I’m
not sure of the exact time frame after
all these years), Wiley distributed stock
options to multiple levels of employees (how
many employees and at what levels, I can’t
remember either). It may have been while I
was running the electronic publishing division,
which I founded around 1980 and headed up for
five years, but I can’t remember the details. In
any event, not too many years after the options
were issued, the company’s stock shot up and a
nice little sudden windfall was there for anyone
who wished to cash in his or her options.
W. Bradford Wiley, the company’s chairman, urged us to retain the shares. It wasn’t
because he feared that dumping a large number
of shares on the market could all be snapped up
by someone who might have designs on accumulating a controlling stake in the firm. The
options the employees held were for A shares,
which were non-voting. The B shares, which
the Wiley family and its confidants held, were
the only voting shares. Mr. Wiley, I believe,
wanted us to retain a stake in the company for
which we worked — not a bad idea, of course.
My windfall, which was a bit over $15,000,
as I recall, was too tempting for me at the time,
so I cashed in my options. Later, when I had
risen to vice-president and general manager
of all scientific and technical publishing at
Wiley, I was granted another, larger cache of
stock options. When I was fired at 10:30 a.m.
on January 10, 1990, I could not cash in these
options for a specified number of days. (I do
remember the date and time with precision.
And just to complete the record, when the
fiscal year ended less than four months later
with fine results for the division I headed, I
and the division’s 135 employees maxed out on
performance bonuses. But I digress.)
While I awaited the day when I could cash
in the options, the stock price slipped slowly
and steadily. The person who fired me remarked that it was like watching an inheritance
melt away. How charming. Thankfully, the
bleeding stopped with some cash still available
to me when my option-maturing day finally
arrived.
I was reminded of my Wiley stock adventures when I decided to write this issue’s column about scholarly publishers’ stock prices. I
hadn’t thought about them for a while and had
little idea where they stood. Of course, there
has been a great deal of vitriol in academia and
elsewhere over the past several decades about
commercial publishers’ substantial profits from
their journals business. And if profits were as
strong as the commercial publishers’ critics
contended, were their shares tremendously
attractive? Would you, no matter how you felt
about profiting from publishing journals with
articles based on publicly funded research, be
interested in investing in these companies with
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a highly profitable business segment? If only
the answer were so simple.
I looked at the four largest commercial
journal publishers, which according to reliable
sources comprise about 30% of the world’s
nearly 35,000 peer-reviewed scholarly journals: Springer, with about 3,000 journals;
Elsevier with maybe a few more; Wiley, with
more than 2,300; and Taylor & Francis, with
about 2,100.
Let’s take Springer first. It’s now part of
Springer Nature, which was formed in 2015
through the merger of Nature Publishing
Group, Palgrave Macmillan, Macmillan
Education and Springer Science+Business
Media. Springer Nature has sales of 1.5
billion Euros, and bills itself as the world’s
largest academic book publisher. If you read
analysts’ reports on scholarly publishers, scholarly book publishing isn’t a space with a great
deal of promise, which is something a potential
investor would need to take into account. If
you could get a piece of the action, that is.
In the case of Springer Nature, privately
held Holtzbrinck Publishing Group, headquartered in Stuttgart, owns 53%. The group,
established by Georg von Holtzbrinck in
1948, began as a German book club. In the
1960s, it moved into publishing, first by purchasing two German publishing companies.
In the 1980s, Holtzbrinck, acquired the retail
book division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
naming it the Henry Holt Book Company, and
Scientific American magazine. In the 1990s, it
purchased a majority interest in distinguished
trade publisher Farrar, Straus & Giroux and
then all of The Macmillan Group. Now it’s
much grander.
London-based BC Partners, which owns
the other 47% of Springer Nature, is a private equity firm specializing in buyouts and
acquisitions financing across all industries in
Europe and the United States. It raises funds
in the billions of dollars. The firm was founded
in 1986 and is a major large cap private equity
firm on the scale of Blackstone Group and
The Carlyle Group. BC was formed originally by the financial firm Barings to advise funds
providing development capital, in particular
for management buyouts. The principals of
Baring Capital Investors completed a spinout
of what would become BC Partners following
Barings’ famous 1995 collapse resulting from
poor speculative investments of a total of $1.3
billion, primarily in futures contracts, pulled off
by a freewheeling Singapore office employee
named Nick Leeson. The firm’s most successful and profitable investments include an
acute care hospital provider and independent
provider of psychiatric care, a seller of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, a cheese
company and a UK mobile phone provider
(now bankrupt).

The bottom line is that you can’t get a piece
of Springer these days, so you don’t have to
worry that its book business is so large.
Now for Taylor & Francis. It’s now part
of Informa, which has its head office in London, is listed on the London Stock Exchange
and is a member of the FTSE 100. It owns
numerous companies in addition to Taylor &
Francis, including CRC Press, Datamonitor,
Institute for International Research, Lloyd’s
List (London Press Lloyd), and Routledge.
Besides publishing, Informa has operations
in the areas of performance improvement and
management consulting, and it runs more than
10,000 conferences annually. Ten years ago,
Informa was approached by Springer Science
and Business Media (now part of Springer
Nature; see above) in a takeover bid, but the
Informa board rejected the offer as too low.
Three years ago, Informa acquired the assets
of Elsevier Business Intelligence (EBI) from
Reed Elsevier, which were combined with other properties to create the Pharma Intelligence
division of Informa Business Information.
So if you want to invest in Taylor & Francis, you have to buy shares in its conglomerate
parent, Informa, which because of its diversity, may be safer than owning stock in a pure
publisher like Taylor & Francis. Just saying.
I’m not here to give investment advice. For
that you should call your broker, which is what
I did when it came to Elsevier and Wiley, the
other two entities on the four largest journal
publishers list. Elsevier is part of what is
now called RELX, which has a market cap of
around $40 billion and is trading in the high
teens, while Wiley, with a market cap of about
$3 billion is trading in the low to mid fifties.
My broker sent me Morning Star Equity
Analyst Reports for both RELX and Wiley.
These reports are thorough examinations of
company operations and prospects. The reports start with a brief pros and cons section
(what “Bulls Say” and what “Bears Say”) and
then get into several pages of analysis that is
very specific and struck me as well-reasoned.
The reports analyze a company’s “economic
moat” (“a structural feature that allows a firm
to sustain excess profits over a long period of
time”), risks and management, among other
factors. The reports, which I can’t quote directly, culminate in a rating between one and five
stars for what is called a “risk-adjusted return.”
As I implied, to see the ratings and read the
reports, you’ll have to get them from a source
that subscribes to them. In the case of Elsevier and Wiley, I found the reports absorbing
reading and a bit surprising. Without giving
anything away, I will say that neither company
is, at the present moment, doomed, according
to reputable equity analysis — although that
isn’t what I found surprising.
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